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THE SPIRIT OF
COMMON LAW AND THE
REFORM OF CANON LAW t
LADISLAS M. ORSY, S.J.*

W

ST. PAUL SPEAKS about the various gifts of the Holy
Spirit that he distributes in a Christian community, he does
not make any mention of the charism of a canon lawyer. And no
doubt, many persons would deny that such a charism exists or could
exist. But at the same time we find that canon lawyers have a
humble but indispensible role in the Church to help to develop and
preserve order and peace in the Christian community and in this
way prepare the ground for the work of the Holy Spirit. Order,
however, does not mean inanimate structures but the ordered play
of creative forces, the ordered release of energies. Order in a living
body is the perfection of movement. Peace does not mean the
absence of tension and of radical change. It means that the moving
forces are rooted in love and carry the community toward a Person.
Both order and peace include a creative element.
HEN

True, the canon lawyer's charism is not that of the theologian.
He is not scrutinizing God's mysteries; he is concerned with simple
norms of action. He is not interpreting the Word of God to an
unbelieving world or to believing disciples; he is concerned with the
practical happiness of God's people. The presence of God among
his people is intimately connected with the life of a human community. The canon lawyer's mission is to build and to strengthen
the life of this community. He has a social mission; his care (as
that of canon law) should be for the community.

t Reprinted with permission from Chicago Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3.
*S.T.L.; M.A.; D.C.L.; Professor of Theology, Fordham University.
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Explained in this way, we doubt that
Paul would have any objection to including the task of the canon lawyer in the
list of charismatic gifts. And he would
probably say that the gift that God
wants to give them is that of discernment: to help in the incarnation of
God's mystery in a human community.
But what has this introduction to do
with the main theme of this article: the
spirit of common law and the reform of
canon law? Perhaps more than appears
at first. If the task of the canonist is to
help the harmonious development of the
Christian community by human means,
by ordered laws, surely the canonist can
learn a great deal from the human wisdom and prudence that developed in secular communities. In fact, canon law
owes a great deal to various legal systems. The impact of Roman law was so
great on it that to this day our Code
carries the substantial division of the
manuals of Roman lawyers who liked to
consider all under the three-fold headings: personae, res et actiones. In fact,
most of our general principles or particular institutions come from Roman
law.
The Church did not consider the Germanic laws as alien to her way of life
when she conquered the peoples of
Northern Europe. Many elements of it are
still retained in our matrimonial and procedural law.
Today it is once again emphasized
that the Church should be inserted into
the life of various peoples. The mystery
of God should take on flesh in different
cultures and civilizations. Hence the
question arises inevitably: should the
Church open its doors to other legal
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influences than the ones received from
Rome, Bezant and the Germanic nations? In particular should the Church
admit the influence of English and American common law?
The answer should be in the affirmative. But we admit that the working out
of the particulars may be difficult and
slow. However, the more difficult it may
appear, the more urgent is the task.
Canon law and common law should come
together and begin a fruitful dialogue.
This article is no more than one step
towards this dialogue. It will not touch
on particular problems; it will remain on
the level of general principles. However,
it is necessary from the beginning to define our terms of reference with reasonable clarity.
We take the term common law in a
broad sense, meaning the whole legal
system that developed in England and
was eventually accepted by many English
speaking countries and even by nations
of another tongue. We include in the
term the branch of law which is known
as equity-although no doubt the lawyers
of the old English chancery court would
rise in protest. We include also the basic
principles of constitutional law, a product
of fairly modern times.
There is no need to define canon law.
But if any doubt exists, we say willingly
that by canon law we mean not only the
Code but also the whole legal system of
the Church including the principles of the
so-called public law.
It is much more difficult to say what
we mean by the spirit of a legal system.
To some extent (but not exclusively) we
mean the first juridical principles that
help in the planning and formulation of
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new laws and in the interpretation of the
old ones. To a greater extent we mean
fundamental human attitudes and virtues
as they are expressed in the whole legal
system more in an intangible way than
by explicit rules or maxims.
The spirit of a legal system is present
everywhere in the laws; at the same time
its root and origin is not so much in the
laws as in the history, in the religious,
cultural and moral life of the community
that makes the laws. The spirit of the
laws does not originate in the laws; it is
an inspiration that comes from outside
and imprints its image on the legal
norms. It is present in the acts of the
legislator, in the statutes and orders, in
the acts and decisions of the judges, and
it is present in the executive and administrative powers-although somewhat less
than in the other two branches of power.
By the reform of canon law we do not
mean the immediate revision of the laws
of the Church only. We mean something
more; we mean the development of the
legal system of the Church in the future.
It is too early to foresee what course the
reform of the Code and the development
of the legal system will follow.
This article, of course, cannot be comprehensive. We have to restrict our investigations to some aspects of the common law and see if the spirit which is
present in them could have a salutary
influence on the evolution of canon law.
In a somewhat pragmatic way we have
selected five aspects which appeared to
us as having a greater importance for
our purpose. The five aspects are: 1)
the balance of powers: the harmony that
common law creates between the various
types of power in the state, in particular

the harmony between the legislative and
executive power and the harmony between the judicial and executive power;
2) the humanity of common law; 3) its
sense of proportion in imposing legal obligations; 4) the law as a moving force;
5) the principle of good faith, an essential element of common law.
We willingly concede that this is not
going to be a critical presentation of
common law. Like any other system,
common law has its own shortcomings
and on a number of points is in sore
need of reform. But our purpose is not
the adequate presentation of common
law. We are interested in those parts of
it only that can serve as an inspiration
for the reform of canon law; this is a
restricted aim no doubt.
The Balance and Harmony
of Powers
Since we are dealing with general principles, it would not be right to go into
details. The constitutional law of English speaking countries may be markedly
different. The power of the Queen of
Great Britain is not the same as the
power of the President of the United
States. The British Parliament does not
function in the same way as the United
States Congress. Great Britain does not
have a supreme court to adjudicate on
the constitutionality of statutes enacted by
the Parliament; the Parliament itself is
the supreme court. In the United States
the Supreme Court is one of the most
it
important constitutional safeguards:
has a power of control over the legislature.
Yet there is a common element in the
various system is; the different types of
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power are so well balanced with each
other that it is legitimate to speak about
a harmony of powers. The legislative and
executive powers are distinct and the judicial power is separated from both. Yet
this separation is never complete; that is
why modern lawyers prefer to speak
about the balance or harmony of powers
instead of their separation. The positive
aspect is more important than the negative one. Also the term separation is a
static concept. Perhaps the terms balance
or harmonious play express better the
necessary movement that has to be
among these powers.
The different
branches are separated in order to make
them into forces working on each other
for the good of the whole. In this way
the road is open for the dynamic development of the community.
Such a division or balancing of the
powers is not so much the fruit of philosophical reflection as the result of centuries-old empirical wisdom. Experience
proves that our human nature is limited:
one man or one group of men can fulfill
one task well; they can serve the cause
of one interest well. But their drive and
impetus will have to be balanced by another man or by another group of men
with different interests in their hearts. If
the two do not act in a spirit of enmity
but in a spirit of harmony the life of the
community will be enriched. They will
mutually limit each other's power and
they will create a creative play of social
forces.
This system of balances can be applied
to the life of the Church, too. At present, in the Church the legislative power
in practice is not well distinguished from
the executive branch of government. The
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main executive organs are the Roman
Congregations and offices. In practice
they are the legislators as well, even if
officially they do not promulgate the
laws. The internal dynamism of an executive organ is essentially conservative;
its task and mission is to preserve the
laws and to urge their observance. It is
right that it should be so; the Church
needs conservative forces. But, the
Church needs progressive forces too; they
should be present in the legislative organs. The legislators should be concerned
with the building up of a new society,
with providing laws for new situations
that progress continually creates.
An example from the recent experience of the Church will help. Before
Vatican 11 the practical planning of the
legislation was the task of the Roman
Congregations, and we all know that the
general tendency was to preserve the
legal structures in all, in great and small.
The preparation for the Council itself,
done mainly by commissions which
worked under the guidance and in the
spirit of the Roman Congregations, demonstrated the same tendencies. But when
the Council convened a new legislative
body appeared, independent and superior
to the executive branch. The result was
a breath of fresh air, a completely new
spirit in our legislation. Surely, the Holy
Spirit was there. But the whole process
of change made perfect sense in terms
of modern civil jurisprudence: an independent legislative organ brought in new
ideas and broke new paths.
It would help the life of the Church
if we had a legislative organ independent
from the executive branch of the Government. A trend was the convocation of
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the Episcopal Synod in the Fall of 1967.
It was not more than a trend since the
Synod did not have any legislative power.
Let us suppose, however, that eventually
under the presidency of the Pope the
Synod becomes representative of the
episcopal conferences and obtains the
power to legislate. Every time the Synod
meets, fresh air could be brought into
the life of the Church. The Synod itself
could set up commissions that would
work parallel with the Roman Congregations. The task of the commissions
would be to plan new laws; the task of
the Congregations would 'be to watch
over the observance of the laws, to give
permissions and dispensations.
Today the judicial power in the
Church is hardly functioning-if we abstract from its use in matrimonial cases.
In reality we have matrimonial tribunals,
scarcely anything else. This is the practice, not the theory. Canon law abundantly provides for the use of tribunals.
But when 99.57 of the cases before the
Sacred Roman Rota are matrimonial
cases it is difficult to argue that by and
large the judicial power in the Church is
functioning.
The main task of the judicial power
should be to interpret the law authentically. The high courts in a common law
country have the power to make a judicial declaration; i.e., the independent judiciary is entitled to interpret the lawaccording to the mind of the legislator
as it is expressed in the text of a statute.
This power of the courts inspires a feeling of security in the citizens; they know
the rule of law will be upheld by the
judges and consequently they feel protected by the courts and by the law. The

ordinary priest or layman in the Church
does not feel that he is protected by
canon law, even if he is. He knows that
the law will be interpreted by those who
have a right to correct, discipline or even
punish him and he would have no appeal
against the interpretation if he finds it
unjust, unfair or debatable. It would
help to develop this feeling of security in
our faithful if our courts too would have
the right to interpret the laws. The same
right should not be given either to special commissions or to the executive offices of the ecclesiastical government.
Right now it appears less certain how
the use of judicial power should be extended in disputes about rights and duties although it should be extended.
This extension will necessarily suppose
a simplification of the procedural rules.
Two years in the first instance and one
in the second do not correspond to our
needs anymore. There is no reason why
the procedural laws of some countries,
at least in minor cases, could not be
canonized by the Church or by the local
Churches.
In common law the judicial procedure is
always marked by a strong personal element. Frequently, a case is decided on a
subjective level: which of the two contending parties the jury or the judge is
prepared to believe. Canon laws aim at
a much more objective standard: the
general rule of evidence is that two
adult male persons' independent testimony about the existence of a fact is
required to establish judicial certainty.
In canon law perhaps a more objective
standard is needed since it is a law for
use among many nations; yet could not
some of that personal approach be ad-
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mitted into our procedure, especially in
cases of small importance? Sometimes a
quick solution is a greater good in itself
than a perfect solution given with delay.
A speedy decision by honest judges in
cases of small importance can benefit the
parties and the community more than
prolonged investigations and a decision
delayed beyond any reasonable limit.
Humanity Through Law
Common law is marked by a deep
humanity. Humanity means here a priority given to the human person over written rules. In the legislation and in the
administration of justice the person is
held in the forefront and not the written
law. An exalted claim, no doubt, for
common law. Yet we believe the claim
can be substantiated.
To demonstrate this spirit of humanity, first of all we quote the existence of
Equity. Side by side with the official
tribunals of the King where the common
law (now in a strict sense) was administered, the Court of Equity arose. There
justice was given to all who could not
get it according to the law. The rule for
the administration of justice at the Court
of Chancery was in the honest conscience
of the Chancellor. At this court the
deeply human rules of Equity developed:
he who seeks equity must do equity; he
who comes into equity must come with
clean hands; equity will not leave a wrong
without a remedy, etc.
The great achievement of the equitable
jurisdiction was that it put a living person between the rigidity of common law
on the one side and the needs of natural
justice (Christian justice, in fact) and
the needs of real life on the other side.
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Through the living person of the Chancellor the law became human.
The conflict between a rigid legal system and the everchanging realities of life
is perhaps inevitable in any community.
Common law somewhat forestalls it; a
living person, the judge, stands with discretionary power between the letter of
the law and the actual case.
This human role of the judge transcends the branch of Equity: the decision of the judge makes law at every
court. The law that he makes may be
good or bad, but he makes law. The
current of legal life runs through a living
man, and being a living man he reacts
with humanity at the meeting point of
abstract rules and concrete cases.
Further, the system of common law is
built on some cardinal ideas that have
not much juridical precision but much
of broad humanity. They can be the despair of judges and scholars sometimes,
especially of those who are hankering
for definitions and are not content with
reality. Some of these concepts are: 1)
reasonable man (the law of torts is based
on the care that a reasonable man should
take in a given situation, or contracts
are to be fulfilled according to the expectation of a reasonable man); 2) common sense (no one knows what it means
exactly but judges go back to it frequently and decide issues by common sense);
3) natural justice (in recent times used
especially at administrative courts); 4)
audiatur et altera pars (a principle for
administration of justice in all circumstances).
Now it is not a human person but a
human concept that stands between the
rigidity of the law and its application.
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The concept is broad; it is a direction
and it is a prohibition. It is a direction,
vague perhaps, but meaningful for all
citizens; it is a prohibition, since nothing
against it should be done even if the act
or judgment appears to fulfill the letter
of the law.
Finally, the discretionary remedies at
the disposition of the courts, mostly of
high courts, transcend the letter or even
the whole text of the law and open up
the possibilities for an informal procedure to give justice in a case that is beyond the reach of the law. The right to
proceed against a person for contempt of
court gives broad powers to a judge to
redress injustices or to enforce actions
that are not provided for by the law.
Similarly, through an injunction the judge
can use his power of discretion to promote peace and justice as he thinks it
necessary in particular circumstances.
These are remedies that enable the court
to deal with personal situations in a
unique way without being hampered by
rules.
If we turn now to canon law and
seek to find the same humanity we find
it wanting.
A court of conscience does not exist
in canon law. There is not any institution, short of personal appeal to the Pope
that would install a living person between
the letter of the law and its application.
We think that such a court of conscience
would have a scope in the Church today.
It should be a court where the parties
(perhaps on oath) are presumed to tell
the truth, and judgment is rendered according to the conscience of the judge.
Abuses may well follow, but the gain in

humanity and equity would outweigh
them.
In a more general way, could the
Church give discretionary power to the
judges? Certainly she could, but our whole
doctrine on judicial precedent should be
re-thought and reformed; this would be a
radical transformation in the legal system.
No doubt, it could not be done suddenly,
only gradually. Perhaps it is already done
in a subtle way. We all say that the decisions of the Rota are not binding on
lower courts; yet all judges in every place
are studying those decisions and by way
of act recognize their authority.
Admittedly some discretionary remedies do exist in canon law, such as suspensio ex informata conscientia, but they
belong more to the field of administrative discretion than to the power of the
judges. The two powers are entirely different. The former should decrease; the
latter should increase.
Sense of Proportion
The spirit of common law reflects a
certain sense of proportion in imposing
legal obligations. By sense of proportion
I mean the respective and graded importance attached to various types of
laws. Some laws are concerned with the
laying of the foundation for the life of
the community; they cannot be disturbed
without the whole structure being somewhat shaken by it. Some laws are structures built on the foundation; they do not
hold the building; therefore, they can be
moved away and substituted in a relatively easy way.
Few, even among the citizens in common law countries, are aware of the fact
that the stability of their laws is not uni-
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form but that there are (to use the words
of a modern commentator) two or three
different layers of laws with varying stability. The most important layer is on
the level of the Supreme Court; all decisions made by it are binding on all the
courts of the land. But the decisions on
the highest level are never too numerous.
They constitute a loose framework, binding all, but leaving much freedom for
action to tribunals at a lower level. One
could easily publish a textbook on contract at common law entitled The Law
of Contract at the Level of the Supreme
Court. It would not be a great volume;
there would be serious gaps in it since
some of the issues never reached the Supreme Court.
Another volume could be The Law of
Contract at Appeal Courts. It would be
larger in size, and it would fill up many
details, but it would still leave some freedom for local customs applied mostly at
the first instance courts; let us call them
county courts.
The whole legal machinery moves on
two or three different levels. All decisions take their importance from their
incorporation into one of those levels.
It is easy to see how their permanency
is effected by their appurtenance to a
lower or higher grade. A sense of proportion pervades the whole system and
brings flexibility into it.
In our code of canon law this sense
of proportion does not exist. All laws
have the same authority; they are promulgated by the Holy See. There are no
laws evolved by judicial precedents. Be
they fundamental or merely accidental
they have the same stability and permanency. The laws concerning an ecumen-
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ical council are side by side with the
laws concerning the chapter of religious
sisters. They form one unit in the Code.
The rather unfortunate but inevitable
need of numeration increases the artificial
unity so that to change one is to disturb
the external structure of the whole.
It should be the subject of long and
careful study how this uniformity could
be broken up and a hierarchy of values
introduced into the legal system of the
Church. The strict application of the
principle of subsidiarity would help. The
reform of canon law should not begin so
much on the top; it should begin rather
at the diocesan level through local legislation and experimentation. The local efforts could be supplemented by legislation by Episcopal Conferences. Finally,
the highest authority of the Church could
make universal laws according to the
universal needs of the Church. The inferior legislator should not be reduced
to a mere executive officer as has happened frequently in the past; he should
have the right to make laws and to
change them according to his best judgment about local needs.
An example much to the point would
be the rule that the change of religious
constitutions on any point is reserved to
the Holy See, or, at least, these constitutions cannot be changed without explicit
permission. If a small change becomes
such a great issue how can it be expected that the religious will be able to keep
ahead of a changing world?
Law as a Moving Force
Common law has a certain dynamic
element in its structure. Without it, it
could not have become the law of so
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many countries. It adapted itself to differing cultural, social and political circumstances through an internal strength,
not through imposition by an external
authority, even if initially such an imposition had taken place.
By dynamic quality we mean an internal strength in the legal system by
which it is able to renew itself in changing circumstances. This quality is the
result of a fine play of balancing forces,
either within the legal structure or from
outside.
Inside the legal structure there are
five balancing forces:
The spirit of common law is
a)
against codification. A neatly designed
legal structure as it is represented by a
code immobilizes the whole system and
takes away its flexibility. Even when for
pragmatic reasons the laws have to be
collected into a systematic order and promulgated as a statute, the decisions of
the courts will be the most important
source for the new collection. The abstract statute has to retain its connection
with the concrete life of the country.
Then all statutes are handed over to the
courts for interpretation. If the courts
would find that laws on the books do not
cover real life situations, they can make
the necessary adjustments, usually in the
form of subtle distinctions.
b) Common law has great respect for
customs and usages and some distrust for
statutory legislation. The common law
conception is not that the legislators conferred legal validity on customs but that
the legislator has to respect the customs
that have their validity out of real existence. The best part of common law, such
as contract, torts, much of the real prop-

erty and constitutional law, developed
through customs.
c)
Common law can be very precise
when it is needed and very vague when
it is useful. Much of the real property
law is worked out with mathematical
precision; many of the fundamental concepts in contract are so vague that they
can be easily adjusted to new developments in the field of commerce and industry.
d) Common law abhors secrecy. The
general trend is always for the openness
of a legal act; secrecy needs justification.
The legislative power works in the open.
Laws are prepared and enacted through
open debate. All groups that have an
interest in new laws have to be consulted
previously. The court deals with their
cases in the open. And the judges have
to give an account of their decisions.
e) Common law has an empirical
foundation and it continuously refers to
and is corrected by empirical facts.
Therefore, it is very difficult for common
law to get out of touch with life.
There is a continual impact from extra-legal sources to which the legal system is open.
Public opinion is a most important
factor in checking, controlling and
correcting the activities of the three
branches of government.
Channels to government exist in the
form of various agencies, corporations and associations that have
their own offices and are consulted
whenever their interest requires.
Constructive criticism flows from
especially
university departments,
from law schools.
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The open debates that are typical of
political life in a democracy cause
social development to soon enter
the field of legislation.
The legal life of the Church needs certainly new balancing forces built into the
system. Some conceivable developments
in this direction are these:
a) The conception of full codification
should be abandoned. Partial codification may be useful, even necessary, in
the Church. But it should not be carried
out by a commission working in secret
and without broad consultation. It should
be somehow the work of the whole
Church. Especially the cooperation and
creative contributions of all the episcopal
conferences, universities and various professional groups is required.
b) Freedom should be given for developing new customs and usages. There
is no community that has such resources,
supernatural and natural, for the development of customs as the Church; but to
give freedom for such development would
require great trust in the Holy Spirit and
in the people of God. It would not be a
misplaced trust.
c) Openness in the administration of
the Church would do much to awaken
latent forces in the community that would
help the development of the Church.
Secrecy breeds distrust and inspires indifference in those who are not initiated
into the secret; openness invites free contribution and generates trust.
d) Canon law should be based much
more on empirical research. Religious
sociology has not made the contribution
that it should to our legislation.
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Full scope should be given also to
extra-legal forces in the Church:
a) Responsible Christian and even
non-Christian public opinion should be
taken account of in the process of legislation. This is not to reduce the laws to
the lowest common denominator but to
trust human nature and in particular human intelligence inside and outside the
Church.
b) There should be much more consultation and participation. Universities
and professional groups should be allowed to represent their problems and
also to ask for special consideration.
c) Much of the human wisdom of
other organizations could be taken into
account, e.g., the international character
of many world-wide political organizations could be taken as a model and inspiration for a universal Church. The
United Nations and all its agencies are
far more international than the Catholic
Church.
Bona Fides:

Good Faith

A quality that exists strongly in common law but is not expressed by the
words that we are using is bona fides,
good faith. This expression is taken from
classical Roman law.
Schulz has remarked that somehow the
whole legal system of Rome was built on
trust and confidence that the leaders of
the community had in the citizens or
even in the peregrines who resided habitually in Rome. It was the fides Romanorum that held the Empire together and
cemented the structure of the laws.
This fides survives, we believe, in common law in many forms and gives it
great internal strength.
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The ordinary citizen has a respect for
the law; he trusts his own legal system
and he believes that he is protected and
served by it in an efficient way. Therefore, on the whole, the community is lawabiding. Also, the legal system too is
structured in such a way that a quiet
trust towards the ordinary citizen transpires through the rules.
In the field of so-called public law to
give importance to custom is to trust the
good sense of the subjects. To give discretionary power to the judges is to have
confidence in the wisdom and integrity
of the judges. To let the jury decide if
a person is guilty or not is to believe
that there is a sense of justice in the jurymen. In the field of so-called private
law the best example is the most obvious
one: the very institution of trust. It
came into being because the citizens
trusted each other, and this mutual trust
is still the foundation and practical condition for a legal trust.
When trust is alive and penetrates into
the whole community then the number
of laws need not be great. If difficulties
arise a solution can be found either by
the legislator or by the judges or by the
citizens without recurring to formal legislation.
If there is no trust in the community
there will be an inflation of laws. The
legislator who does not trust the community will make norms against every
conceivable evasion and by doing so he
will overburden the community. Next,
the community, overburdened, will really
try to escape from the weight of laws,
finding loopholes and fine distinctions.
Then the legislator will react by making
even more laws and imposing even more

restrictions on the subjects. As in any
case of inflation, the vicious spiral will
speed up and will eventually lead to a
grave disease in the community.
It should be possible to build bona
fides, good faith, into the legal system of
the Church to a much greater extent
than it is there now. To do this a certain vision and the acceptance of certain
principles would 'be necessary.
The vision should be that of God's
people: imperfect and sinful people, no
doubt, but also blessed by God's grace,
moved by the Spirit to the final revelation of the Kingdom of God. A vision
of God's pilgrim Church would be necessary.
For this community no perfect legal
order is possible or even desirable because law is not the primary factor in
keeping the members together. Therefore, the aim in 'building up the legal
system should not be an abstract perfection but the best suitable organization in
the circumstances; this can be an imperfect one. The realization is necessary that
it is really not law that holds the community together but a Person, the Holy
Spirit. Consequently, a lack of perfection
in the legal system will not be able to
destroy the cohesion of the community
at the deepest level. This is not to advocate lawlessness but to put the value
of Christ's promise in strong terms and
to situate law in its own place.
The legislator should trust, above all,
the Holy Spirit, the source of the unity
of the community. He should believe in
the effectiveness of the promise of Christ
that the Spirit will never abandon God's
own people. The scope of the law is not
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to make the community but to better its
life through external organization.
The legislator should trust also God's
children in their basic thrust towards
God. He should believe that they do not
want to escape God's laws; rather, they
want to submit themselves to them. And
finally, the legislator should trust human
nature that produced so many good legal
principles outside the Church. It is likely
to produce even better ones in the
Church.
The laws themselves should demonstrate this overall trust. And trust should
not be withdrawn when some are abusing it.
To build up this trust some of our
laws should be relaxed or plainly abolished. We have suffered and we are still
suffering from an inflation of laws.
Fundamental structural laws must be
clearly known and firmly applied. But
unnecessary burdens should not, in the
form of discipline, be placed on individual consciences. Fewer laws would give
immediately greater scope to the creative
action of the Spirit of God, of the children of God and of human nature. New
customs would begin to develop and enrich the life of the Church. New technical, legal knowledge would be brought
into the life of the community. On the
surface the relaxation of laws would bring
a certain looseness into the texture of
the community but at a deeper level it
would bring a deeper cohesion.
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Even more, the exercise of authority
could become more humane and more
Christian. Instead of introducing a hierarchical order and precedence of honor
into the life of the community there
could be more of free associations of free
persons, all working for the same goal.
A parish need not be necessarily taken
care of by a pastor to whom several assistants owe obedience. It could be well
helped by a team of priests working together with one mind and one heart. The
administration of the diocese need not
be done by orders coming from the
bishop or from the chancery but it could
be taken care of by a body of presbyters
under the effective presidency of the
bishop. The Holy Father himself will not
need to suffer agonies in making a decision but he could trustingly resort to the
bishops, knowing that through them the
Holy Spirit will give the light much more
than through the study of documents.
And in all this process the layfolk
would not be looked on with suspicion
but as brothers and sisters, cooperators
-;I
in Christ.
There is no doubt that the task of
canon lawyers in the life of the Church
could be considered a charismatic gift.
It is to help principally the humanity of
the Church. This task has its roots in
faith and in theological knowledge, but it
requires a worldly skill and a greater
deal of practical wisdom as well.

